Introduction
In recent years, significant demands for shell companies for backdoor listings can be seen as a factor to explain the substantial increase in the value attached to the listing status on the Hong Kong stock exchange. The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (the “Exchange”) noted an increase in market activities related to the creation and the trading of shell companies involving not only listings of new applicants whose sizes and prospects do not appear to justify the cost or purpose associated with a public listing, but also listed issuers with failed business attempting to maintain their listing status by establishing new businesses that have a lower threshold for entry and/or can be conveniently established and discontinued without considerable costs.
While shell activities are limited to a small segment of the market, the Exchange considers that these activities invite speculative trading and can lead to opportunities for market manipulation and unnecessary volatility, which may compromise the reputation and overall quality of the Hong Kong stock market. In response to this, the Exchange published a consultation paper on 29 June 2018 to codify certain guidance letters provisions into the Main Board Listing Rules (the “MBLR”) and the GEM Listing Rules (the “GLR”) (collectively, the “Listing Rules”) as well as to impose further requirements. A summary of such proposed amendments relating to backdoor listing is set out below.
Proposed amendments to the Listing Rules
| Principle based test |
(a) the size of transaction relative to the size of the issuer; (b) the quality of the business to be acquired – whether it can meet the trading record requirements for listings, or whether it is unsuitable for listing (e.g. an early stage exploration company); (c) the nature and scale of the issuer’s business before the acquisition (e.g. whether it is a listed shell); (d) any fundamental change in the issuer’s principal business (e.g. the existing business would be discontinued or very immaterial to the enlarged group’s operations after the acquisition); (e) other events and transactions (historical, proposed or intended) which, together with the acquisition, form a series of arrangements to circumvent the RTO Rules (e.g. a disposal of the issuer’s original business simultaneously with a very substantial acquisition); and (f) any issue of restricted convertible securities to the vendor which would provide it with de facto control of the issuer.
(a) the criterion of “issue of restricted convertible securities” will be extended to include any change in control or de facto control of the issuer; (b) the “series of arrangements” criterion will be clarified: i. to mean any transactions and/or arrangements that are in reasonable proximity (normally within a period of three years) or otherwise related; and ii. that it is no longer required for the proposed (last) transaction to be an acquisition to trigger the Listing Rules in relation to RTOs. |
| Bright line tests and restriction on material disposals |
(a) an acquisition or a series of acquisitions of assets constituting a very substantial acquisition where there is or which will result in a change in control (as defined in the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-backs (the “Takeovers Code”)) of the listed issuer; or (b) very substantial acquisition(s) of assets (individually or in aggregate) from the new controlling shareholder and/or any of its associates within 24 months following a change in control (as defined in the Takeovers Code).
|
| Extreme transactions |
(a) the issuer has been operating a principal business with substantial size which will continue after the transaction (as a general guidance, this may include a principal business with annual revenue or total asset value of HK$1 billion or more, excluding any revenue or assets not attributable to the issuer’s original principal business); or (b) the listed issuer has been under control of a large business enterprise for a long period of time (normally not less than three years), and the transaction forms part of a business restructuring of the group and would not result in a change in control.
|
| Additional requirements applicable to RTOs and extreme transactions |
(a) Both the acquisition target(s) and the enlarged group must be suitable for listing (pursuant to MBLR 8.04 / GLR 11.06). (b) The acquisition target(s) must also meet MBLR 8.05 (or 8.05A or 8.05B) / GLR 11.12A (or GLR 11.14)). (c) In case an issuer has failed to comply with MBLR 13.24 / GLR 17.26) regarding its sufficient operations, each of the acquisition target(s) and the enlarged group must meet all the new listing requirements of Chapter 8 MBLR / Chapter 11 GLR.
|
| Backdoor listings via large scale issue of securities |
|
Implications
The consultation paper and its proposals represent a policy response by the Exchange to the prevailing trend of creation and trading of shell companies in the Hong Kong stock markets. If the proposed amendments are in place, taking into account the proposed extended aggregation period and track record period, together with the proposed additional regulatory requirements and restrictions, it is expected that the costs for and the risks associating with backdoor listings will increase. The proposed regime is expected to change the course of cost-and-benefit analyses of investors and listed companies alike.
This newsletter is for information purposes only. Its content does not constitute legal advice, and should not be treated as such. Stevenson, Wong & Co. will not be liable to you in respect of any special, indirect or consequential loss or damage.
Please contact Mr. Hank Lo or Mr. Rodney Teoh for any enquiries or further information.
