Stevenson, Wong & Co. is pleased to announce that our Partner and Head of Banking and Finance, Litigation and Dispute Resolution, and Co-head of the FinTech Group, Heidi Chui, alongside our Partner and Deputy Head of Corporate Finance and Co-head of the FinTech Group, Rodney Teoh, have been honoured as Growth Drivers in The A-List 2025–26 by China Business Law Journal.

This recognition reaffirms the sustained leadership of both Partners in their respective fields. Ms. Chui has been acknowledged for this accolade for the fifth consecutive year, while Mr. Teoh has received this honour for the third consecutive year.

The selection for the “A-List Elite Lawyers” is based on thousands of nominations and independent research from corporate legal counsel, executives, and legal peers, ensuring a high level of industry credibility. The “Legal Elite” category specifically aims to recognise exceptional lawyers who demonstrate both profound professional expertise and significant market influence, particularly in driving business development and earning client trust.

We would like to express our gratitude to China Business Law Journal and our clients for their ongoing support.

For further details, please contact our Partners, Heidi Chui and Rodney Teoh, or view the official report on the CBLJ website here.

 

HKEX Publishes Consultation Paper on Enhancements to Board Lot Framework

 9 January 2026

1. Introduction

On 18 December 2025, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (“HKEX” or the “Exchange”) published a consultation paper on proposed enhancements to the board lot framework in the Hong Kong securities market (the “Consultation Paper”). The initiative, mandated by the HKSAR Government’s Task Force on Enhancing Stock Market Liquidity established in August 2023, aims to streamline trading, clearing and settlement processes while expanding investor participation.

The consultation period will run until 12 March 2026. Stakeholders are invited to submit feedback via HKEX’s online questionnaire, with a consultation conclusions paper tentatively (the “Consultation Conclusions”) scheduled for release by the end of the first half of 2026. This update breaks down the core proposals, their strategic rationale, and potential impacts on market participants.

2. Background: Hong Kong’s Board Lot Framework

A board lot is the standard number of shares required for a single transaction in the securities market, serving as a cornerstone of orderly trading and operational efficiency. Unlike most major global exchanges that adopt a single unified board lot unit, Hong Kong’s current framework is “issuer-led”, allowing each listed company to determine its own board lot size.

This approach has resulted in significant fragmentation. Currently, 44 distinct board lot units are in use, ranging from 10 shares to 100,000 shares. While 2,000 shares is the most common unit which is used by 25% of issuers, the 100-share unit accounts for the largest share of average daily turnover and market capitalisation.

This fragmentation has created multiple challenges:

(i)      Operational inefficiencies: Complexity in trading, clearing and settlement processes;
(ii)      Barriers to retail participation: Extremely high board lot values make certain securities
          unaffordable for small investors, while low board lot values risk “negative value trades”
          where execution costs exceed trade value; and
(iii)      Misalignment with global practices: Divergence from international standards complicates
          cross-market trading, particularly for Southbound Stock Connect investors familiar with
          Mainland China’s unified 100-share board lot.

Additionally, Hong Kong’s market has a higher proportion of low-priced securities (56% of securities traded in the Hong Kong securities market (“Applicable Securities”) trade below HK$1.0) and fixed execution costs, making an immediate shift to a single unified board lot unit impractical due to the risk of widespread negative value trades.

3. Key Enhancements in Detail

3.1  Board Lot Value Floor and Ceiling Guidance

To balance accessibility and risk mitigation, HKEX proposes revising existing guidance and introducing a new ceiling:

(i)      Reduction of board lot value floor guidance: HKEX proposes decreasing the existing board
          lot value floor from HK$2,000 to HK$1,000. This adjustment reduces entry barriers without
          increasing negative value trade risks. The floor applies only when issuers list or adjust board
          lot units. No action is required if stock price movements push values below HK$1,000.
(ii)      Introduction of board lot value ceiling guidance: HKEX proposes to introduce board lot
          value ceiling at HK$50,000, applicable only to issuers using units larger than 100 shares. The
          ceiling encourages issuers to split units to maintain accessibility.

 3.2 Standardisation of board lot units

HKEX proposes reducing the number of permissible board lot units to eight board lot options (i.e., 1, 50, 100, 500, 1,000, 2,000, 5,000, and 10,000 share(s)), covering diverse price bands from HK$0.1 to HK$1,000+ per share. The proposed new board lot framework would result in 657 securities needing to change board lot units, representing approximately 25% of the 2,680 Applicable Securities. The standardised set supports future convergence to a single unit by encouraging gradual adoption of smaller units.

 3.3 Phased Implementation Aligned with the Uncertificated Securities Market (“USM”)

To minimise market disruption, the framework will be rolled out in two phases, coordinated with HKEX’s USM initiative which replaces physical share certificates with electronic records:

Phase One:

(i)      New issuers: Must adopt the eight standardised units and comply with the HK$1,000
          floor/HK$50,000 ceiling upon listing.
(ii)      Existing issuers: No immediate unit standardisation required. Only need to adhere to the
          HK$1,000 floor/HK$50,000 ceiling guidelines.

Phase Two: Existing issuers must adopt one of the standardised units within a specified period after transitioning to USM. This aims at avoiding reprint physical share certificates and optimising issuer resources.

 A detailed implementation timeline may be included in the Consultation Conclusions Paper.

4. Strategic Implications for Market Participants

The proposed enhancements will have distinct impacts on key market stakeholders:

 Approximately 25% of listed issuers will need to revise their board lot units to one of the eight standardised options. In the long term, these reforms will reduce operational complexity and better align with the needs of global and international investors—particularly for “A+H share” issuers seeking consistency across Mainland China and Hong Kong markets. Issuers must continuously monitor their board lot values to ensure compliance with the HK$50,000 ceiling applicable to units exceeding 100 shares.

Investors will benefit from lower entry barriers, expanding access to high-quality securities, reducing concentration risk, and enabling portfolio diversification. Institutional investors will find trading, hedging and settlement processes simplified by standardised units, lowering operational costs and the risk of errors.

Fewer board lot units significantly enhance the operational efficiency of brokers and intermediaries by streamlining system configurations, order entry, and client onboarding processes. Reduced odd lot creation and clearer value guidelines help mitigate operational and settlement risks, strengthening risk management. Additionally, standardised board lots simplify the management of associated products, whose terms are often linked to the underlying securities’ board lot units, eliminating the need for complex adjustments.

5. Conclusion

The consultation period runs until 12 March 2026, and all interested parties—including issuers, brokers, institutional and retail investors, legal and compliance professionals, and investor advocacy groups—are strongly encouraged to submit feedback via the Exchange’s online questionnaire.

Given the transformative nature of these proposals, stakeholders are urged to:

(i)      review the Consultation Paper in full (available on HKEX’s website);
(ii)      provide detailed, data-driven feedback by 12 March 2026 to shape the final rules; and
(iii)      prepare for phased implementation, particularly aligning systems and processes with USM
          transition timelines.

The success of this reform will depend on balancing operational efficiency, investor accessibility and issuer flexibility, ensuring Hong Kong’s securities market remains dynamic, inclusive and aligned with global best practices.

Please contact our Partner Mr. Rodney Teoh for any enquiries or further information.

This news update is for information purposes only. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be treated as such. Stevenson, Wong & Co. will not be liable to you in respect of any special, indirect or consequential loss or damage arising from or in connection with any decision made, action or inaction taken in reliance on the information set out herein.

In the dynamic landscape of Hong Kong’s financial markets, the Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) serves as the primary regulator. For market participants, including licensed corporations, directors, and investment managers, understanding the breadth of the SFC’s powers is not just a compliance exercise, but a critical component of risk management. For a layman, it is equally important to understand what legal responsibility and implications could entail should you receive any enquiry or request from the SFC, hence protecting your legal position.

Recent enforcement trends and court decisions in late 2025 have reinforced a clear message: the SFC’s investigative powers are extensive, it has little patience for non-compliance, and it does not hesitate to exercise its enforcement toolkit.

Section 183: The Power to Investigate

The cornerstone of the SFC’s authority lies in Section 183 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571, “SFO”). This section empowers the SFC to compel any person – not just the subject of the investigation – to provide information in the context of an investigation under Section 182 of the SFO.

Unlike in police investigations, where your right to silence is fundamental, the SFO significantly abrogates this right. If you receive a Section 183 notice, you are legally obligated to:

• Produce records and documents;
• Provide written explanations regarding those documents; and
• Attend interviews to answer questions.

Crucially, you cannot refuse to answer on the grounds of self-incrimination. While you can claim privilege to prevent your answers from being used against you in criminal proceedings, those same answers can still be used in civil or disciplinary actions, or to lead investigators to other admissible evidence.

The Trap of Secrecy

A common pitfall for those under investigation is the Section 378 secrecy provision. Upon receiving a notice, you are essentially bound by a strict statutory “gag order”. You must not disclose the existence of the investigation or the notice to anyone, including your colleagues, spouse, or employer, without the SFC’s express consent.

The only major exception is disclosing the information to your lawyer for the purpose of seeking legal advice. Breaching this secrecy is a criminal offence in itself, exposing one to be prosecuted independently of the underlying misconduct.

Recent Case Law: No Excuses for Non-Compliance

The High Court’s judgment in October 2025 in SFC v. oOo Securities (HK) Group Limited [2025] HKCFI 4584 serves as a stark reminder of the consequences of ignoring these obligations.

In this case, a licensed corporation failed to comply with Section 183 notices, citing a change in management and the loss of records during a relocation to Beijing. The Court rejected these defences, holding that:

• Changes of ownership or management do not absolve a corporation of its regulatory duties. The new owners must conduct due diligence and ensure compliance.
• Lost records are not a sufficient excuse unless substantiated with specific proof, especially if the loss occurred after the deadline for production.

The Court ordered the firm to comply and ruled that they were liable for penalties, paving the way for fines. This confirms that the SFC will use Section 185 to seek court orders and punish those who treat regulatory notices lightly.

The Multi-Track Enforcement Regime

Once an investigation concludes, the SFC has ample choices within its arsenal to further pursue against the wrongdoer(s). The SFC operates a dual-track system, allowing it to pursue misconduct through civil, criminal, or disciplinary routes depending on the severity of the case.

1. Disciplinary Proceedings (SFO Part IX): The most common tool against licensed persons. Sanctions range from public reprimands and fines (up to HK$10 million, or 3 times the profit gained, whichever is higher) to the revocation of licenses.
2. Market Misconduct Tribunal (MMT): An independent inquisitorial body that handles market misconduct cases such as insider dealing and price rigging. It can impose various orders, such as “cold shoulder” orders (banning trading) and disqualification orders against directors, but not criminal sanctions such as imprisonment.
3. Criminal Prosecution: For serious offences, the SFC can prosecute summarily or (for more complex cases) refer the case to the Department of Justice for indictment, where jail terms are routinely sought.
4. Civil Remedies (e.g. applications under SFO Sections 213 and 214): Increasingly used to obtain injunctions, freeze assets or seek restoration orders to compensate investors who have suffered losses.

Scrutiny on Asset Managers

The SFC has also sharpened its focus on the asset management sector. Following a circular in October 2024, the regulator has been rigorously inspecting private fund managers for “substandard conduct,” particularly regarding conflicts of interest and risk management.

Common deficiencies identified include using fund assets to finance related entities, prioritizing staff redemptions over clients, and inappropriately valuing assets to hide losses. Managers-In-Charge and Responsible Officers should be aware that they bear primary responsibility for these failures.

Conclusion

Compliance with the SFO is not optional. As the oOo Securities case demonstrates, internal administrative hurdles or staffing changes are no defence against statutory obligations.

If you or your firm receives a Section 183 notice or is subject to an inspection, immediate legal advice is essential to navigate the delicate balance between cooperation, privilege, and secrecy.

At Stevenson, Wong & Co., our regulatory and compliance team has extensive experience advising listed companies, licensed corporations and individuals on SFC investigations, disciplinary proceedings, and compliance strategy. We can assist you in:

• Responding to Section 183 notices and attending SFC interviews;
• Conducting internal investigations and “health checks” on internal controls; and
• Advising and representing you in any MMT or Court proceedings initiated by the SFC.

To discuss how we can assist you, please contact our Ms. Rainbow Ip, Mr. Kenneth Leung or Mr. Ronnie Tse.

This article is for information purposes only. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be treated as such. Stevenson, Wong & Co. will not be liable to you in respect of any special, indirect or consequential loss or damage arising from or in connection with any decision made, action or inaction taken in reliance on the information set out herein.

The fallout from the JPEX incident, which saw over 2,500 investors claim losses exceeding HK$1.6 billion^[1], has shaken the regulatory landscape for financial marketing in Hong Kong. This was not a simple platform collapse, but a massive alleged fraud driven by an omnipresent, public-facing promotional campaign involving social media influencers (KOLs), over-the-counter (OTC) shops, and mainstream advertising.^[2]

The subsequent arrests of platform operators and numerous high-profile influencers have exposed a new and hazardous regulatory environment for influencers, marketing agencies, and maybe even licensed corporations that associate with them. The red lines between marketing and criminal conduct are now being drawn by prosecutors.  This incident not only highlights vulnerabilities in investor protection but also marks a pivotal moment in how Hong Kong authorities will police the promotion of high-risk investments.

This development does not exist in a vacuum. It echoes the enforcement trend on financial commentators we analysed in our recent newsletter, “What ‘Finfluencers’ should not do. The SFC is Watching!“. In that article, we detailed the SFC’s crackdown on individuals carrying on a business of “advising on securities” (i.e. Type 4 regulated activity) without a licence, a crackdown that resulted in the first-ever custodial sentence for an unlicensed ‘finfluencer’.

The JPEX case involves a different legal framework—the virtual asset service provider (“VASP”) regime under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Ordinance (“AMLO”)—but the policy goal is identical: to stamp out the unlicensed promotion of high-risk investments to the public. The legal “traps” , however, are new and much more expansive.

The New Offences: From SFO ‘Finfluencers’ to AMLO ‘Promoters’

The key legal distinction is the underlying asset. The ‘finfluencer’ prosecutions relate to providing advice on securities (stocks), which is a licensed activity under the Securities and Futures Ordinance (“SFO”).

The JPEX platform, however, primarily dealt in virtual assets, such as Bitcoin. Therefore, the promoters’ liability stems from the new VASP regime under the AMLO. This regime introduces specific criminal offences that directly target promoters.

1. The Advertising Offence: Promoting the Unlicensed

Under the new AMLO VASP regime, it is a specific offence for any person to “issue advertisements” of an unlicensed VASP to the Hong Kong public.^[3]

Hence, as long as the VASP is to the promoter’s knowledge unlicensed, a mere disclaimer of “this is not financial advice” is useless. The question that matters is: “Is the platform licensed by the SFC?” If the promoter knows that the platform is not on the SFC’s list of licensed VATPs, any promotion of it to the Hong Kong public would be a criminal offence. In the JPEX case, the platform was unlicensed, and its promoters were allegedly making false claims that it had applied for a licence.^[4]

2. The Anti-Fraud Offence: ‘Fraudulently or Recklessly‘ Inducing Investment

The AMLO has also introduced a powerful new anti-fraud provision: an offence for any person to “fraudulently or recklessly induce others to invest in virtual assets”. This carries a maximum penalty of 7 years’ imprisonment and a HK$1 million fine.^[5]

“Fraudulently” is clear: essentially, it means lying, such as by repeating false claims of licensure. The more dangerous word for promoters is “recklessly”.

For “recklessly”, a near-identical provision in the SFO (s. 107) could provide an analogy for interpretation. In this regard, a promoter might act “recklessly” if they:

• Make a forecast that is not justified by facts (e.g., allegedly promoting JPEX’s 21% APY on Ethereum without any basis or diligence); or

 

• Make a statement that omits a material fact, making it misleading (e.g., allegedly promoting JPEX while failing to disclose the material fact that it was unlicensed and on the SFC’s Alert List).

This provision effectively nullifies the “DYOR” (Do Your Own Research) disclaimer. The law now places the burden on the promoter to conduct their own diligence. Promoting an unlicensed, high-yield product without verifying its claims, could well fall within the definition of recklessness.

3. Conspiracy to Defraud

Finally, promoters may be charged with the common law offence of ‘conspiracy to defraud‘. This charge, which carries a maximum sentence of 14 years^[6], may apply where there is an agreement to use dishonest means to put investors’ economic interests at risk.

When a promoter agrees with an unlicensed platform to read a misleading script, promote unjustified returns, and drive public investment, the prosecution can argue they are no longer a marketer, but rather a co-conspirator.

What This Means for You

The parallel enforcement actions under the SFO (for securities) and the AMLO (for virtual assets) appear to reveal a new, unified regulatory posture:-

• For Influencers and KOLs: The “I’m just a marketer” is likely to be a very weak defence. Finfluencers may now be regarded as a gatekeeper with a duty of diligence. Promoting any financial product or platform without first verifying its licence status and the factual basis of its claims could expose them to severe criminal liability.

 

• For Licensed Corporations (LCs): As detailed in our finfluencer newsletter, LCs’ responsibility for the agents engaged is crucial. LCs may need to consider whether their internal controls should now include due diligence on an influencer’s entire public profile, including their virtual asset promotions. Engaging an influencer who is recklessly promoting an unlicensed VASP may put the LCs’ “fit and proper” status and internal controls into question.

 

• For Marketing and PR Agencies: By contracting with a platform like JPEX and engaging influencers on its behalf, marketing and PR agencies may bear the risk of being an aider, abettor, or co-conspirator to a criminal offence. Marketing and PR agencies need to consider whether their client-onboarding process should now include a legal and regulatory compliance check, starting with the SFC’s public registers.

With the now expanded regulatory perimeter, all parties must ensure they do not cross the line between marketing and criminal solicitation. It is vital that all entities in this ecosystem review their compliance frameworks, influencer engagement policies, and client onboarding processes immediately.

At Stevenson, Wong & Co., our regulatory and compliance team has extensive experience advising clients on their obligations under both the SFO and the new AMLO VASP regime. To discuss how these new risks impact your business, please contact our Ms. Rainbow Ip or Mr. Kenneth Leung.

^[1] https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1830269-20251105.htm

^[2] https://www.acrc.hku.hk/Case/Detail/2212

^[3] AMLO s 53ZRE

^[4] https://www.sfc.hk/en/News-and-announcements/Policy-statements-and-announcements/Statement-on-JPEX

^[5] AMLO s 53ZRG

^[6] Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) s 159C(6)

This news update is for information purposes only. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be treated as such. Stevenson, Wong & Co. will not be liable to you in respect of any special, indirect or consequential loss or damage arising from or in connection with any decision made, action or inaction taken in reliance on the information set out herein.

We are honoured to announce that Partner and Head of the Corporate Finance Department, Hank Lo, has once again been named one of “The A-List Elite Lawyers” by the prestigious legal publication, China Business Law Journal (CBLJ).

This distinction marks the sixth consecutive year that Mr. Lo has received this accolade. Following his inclusion in 2024, he has once again been listed in the highest tier, the “Visionaries” category, underscoring his exceptional professional expertise and leadership within the industry.

The CBLJ “The A-List Elite Lawyers” list aims to honour top lawyers who have made significant contributions to the China market and China-related business. The selection process is based on extensive market research, incorporating thousands of nominations and independent evaluations from in-house counsel, company executives, and legal professionals.

The list is divided into three categories: “Visionaries,” “Growth Drivers,” and “Rising Stars.” The “Visionaries” category specifically celebrates senior legal leaders who excel both within their firms and across the broader industry. These elite individuals typically hold pivotal roles such as managing partners or department heads, leveraging their strategic foresight to contribute to the advancement of the legal profession.

Mr. Lo possesses over three decades of extensive experience in capital markets, corporate finance, mergers and acquisitions, and corporate compliance. Recently, he has been admitted to practise as a solicitor in the United Arab Emirates and actively expanding the firm’s legal services into the UAE and the Middle East to facilitate Chinese enterprises with their “going global” strategies and international expansion.

We extend sincere gratitude to CBLJ for this recognition and offer most heartfelt thanks to our  clients for their unwavering trust and support.

For further details, please contact our Partner, Hank Lo, or view the official report on the CBLJ website here.

自2022年10月香港政府发布首份《有关香港虚拟资产发展的政策宣言》起，香港在虚拟资产监管方面驶入快车道，先后推出了虚拟资产交易平台牌照、以及稳定币发行牌照制度。2025年6月，港府发布《香港数字资产发展政策宣言2.0》，并就虚拟资产交易服务提供商及虚拟资产托管服务提供商的发牌机制进行公众咨询。2025年9月30日，证监会与金管局联合发布《有关中介人的虚拟资产相关活动的补充联合通函》，正式允许为客户进行虚拟资产交易的中介人可向客户提供虚拟资产质押（Staking）服务。[1] 2025年11月3日，证监会又颁布了新的指引，以便利持牌虚拟资产交易平台连接全球流动性和扩展多元化产品及服务，其中包括取消了在虚拟资产交易平台上向专业投资者发售的虚拟资产（包括稳定币）须先具备12个月往绩纪录的要求。香港持续不断地推出支持虚拟资产生态的政策，目标是打造“值得信赖、可持续且深度融入实体经济的数字资产生态圈”。[2]这些政策的推行，必将吸引越来越多的虚拟资产生态圈的从业者在香港展业。

在香港开展虚拟资产相关业务，必须要了解其监管思路与法律框架。在香港现行的法律下，对包括加密货币在内的虚拟资产的监管框架可以概括为“证券型”与“非证券型”虚拟资产双轨并行模式，证监会与金管局为主要的监管机构。本文将通过梳理现行的监管制度和牌照类别，帮助读者把握香港虚拟资产监管体系全貌。

• 证券型虚拟资产监管机制

 作为国际金融中心，香港拥有一套完善的证券监管体系，其核心法律为香港法例第571 章《证券及期货条例》（下称“SFO”），主要监管机构为证监会，而金管局则负责银行金融机构的证券活动监管。在SFO的监管体系下，与证券或期货相关的业务需要取得相应的许可或牌照。

• 监管原则

 当任何虚拟资产的性质符合“证券”的定义，其发行及相关的各种中介活动均会与传统证券一样落入SFO的监管范围，触发相应的发行许可、中介牌照与其它合规要求。例如，包装为虚拟资产的代币化证券的发行，仍然需要受与传统证券发行一样的监管。当前备受关注的RWA（真实世界资产）的代币化，如果其属性与传统证券相同，例如代币赋予持有人分享公司利润或参与管理的权利，则无法避免证券监管的适用。证监会尤其强调“透视（see-through approach）”的监管方式和“相同业务、相同风险、相同规则”的监管原则，即不会单纯依据产品名称或表面“包装”，而是会透过实质来判断虚拟资产的法律属性。同样地，开展证券型虚拟资产的中介业务也需要取得相应的证券牌照，例如证券交易（第1类）、就证券提供意见（第4类）、提供自动化交易服务（第7类）与提供资产管理（第9类）牌照。

• 传统证券牌照的虚拟资产业务升级

 若传统证券持牌机构拟涉及虚拟资产，则应向证监会申请将牌照升级以涵盖虚拟资产业务。例如，持9号牌的基金管理人如果计划将其管理投资组合中超过10%的资产投资于虚拟资产，就需要申请9号牌的“升级”（Licence Uplift）。升级后，必须遵循证监会为虚拟资产制定的特定条件，涵盖资产托管、风险管控以及反洗钱。再如，涉及证券型虚拟资产的交易平台，则需要持有升级的1号牌和7号牌。

证监会对不同的提供虚拟资产服务的牌照会施加不同的额外发牌条件，这些条件包括但不限于财务稳健性、负责人员的能力与经验、客户虚拟资产保管、风险控制系统、反洗钱措施等。

• AMLO体系下的虚拟资产交易平台牌照

 适用范围

2022年12月修订的香港法例第615 章《打击洗钱及恐怖分子资金筹集条例》（下称“AMLO”）引入了对虚拟资产服务提供者（VASP）的新发牌制度，自2023年6月1日起，凡在香港运营中心化虚拟资产交易平台（VATP），须按AMLO申请VATP牌照。实践中，VATP主要覆盖非证券型代币，例如比特币。鉴于虚拟资产代币属性常常变化，证监会建议虚拟资产交易平台应同时申请SFO和AMLO制度下的牌照（即双重发牌制度），以避免违反许可制度并确保业务连续性。截至2025年10月30日，市场上同时持有“双重牌照”的虚拟资产交易平台营运者仅11家[3]。

• VATP牌照申请基本要求

在港从事VATP业务，申请人须满足适当人选与胜任力、本地实体与治理架构、财务稳健、客户资产托管与客户处理、市场操纵防范、反洗钱/记录保存与持续申报等方面的硬性与持续性要求；如同时涉及证券型代币，还需并行遵从SFO中的持牌要求。AMLO及《适用于虚拟资产交易平台营运者的指引》中的基本要求包括但不限于：

• 本地实体：申请人须是香港本地法团且在港有常设营业地点，或是海外法团但已于香港根据香港法例第622 章《公司条例》注册；
• 适当人选与胜任能力：持牌人须在财政状况或偿付能力，学历或其他资历或经验，是否有能力称职、诚实而公正地进行有关活动，信誉、品格、可靠程度及在财政方面的稳健性四个方面符合SFO、AMLO中的适当人选标准；证监会将依据个案判断持牌法团与相关人士是否具备胜任能力进行持牌活动[4]；

就申请成为负责人员（RO）的个人而言，证监会设有三种主要方式以符合胜任能力要求：

选项A： 申请人持有指定范畴（会计、工商管理、经济、金融或法律）学位，或其他学位但在指定范畴至少两科取得合格，或持有国际认可的专业资格（如CFA、CIIA、CFP）；同时需于过去六年内具备至少三年相关行业经验、两年管理经验，并通过本地监管框架考试。

选项B： 申请人持有其他学位（无须在指定范畴取得两科合格）；同时需于过去六年内具备至少三年相关行业经验、两年管理经验，取得认可行业资格或完成相关额外持续进修，并通过本地监管框架考试。

选项C： 申请人于香港中学文凭考试取得英文或中文及数学第二级成绩或同等学历；同时需于于过去六年内具备至少三年相关行业经验及取得认可行业资格（或过去八年内具备至少五年相关行业经验及完成相关额外持续进修） 、两年管理经验，并通过本地监管框架考试。

此外，若申请人未具备上述学历或专业资格，但于2022年1月1日前已为持牌人，且于过去11年内累积至少八年相关行业经验，并符合管理经验及本地监管框架考试要求，证监会亦可考虑其申请。

针对相关的“行业经验”，由于拟出任的负责人员需要双重牌照申请，而目前市场缺乏兼具虚拟资产及证券相关经验的人才，因此证监会采取务实的做法，现时将会视只具备虚拟资产或证券相关的其中一项经验的负责人员申请人的经验为符合另一套牌照规定的经验，但会在其牌照上施加额外的限制条件。

• 财务稳健：平台营运者应时刻在香港维持具有充分流动性的资产（非虚拟资产，其金额应相等于其按持续基准计算至少12个月的实际营运开支）、不少于5,000,000港元的缴足资本及规定速动资金；依规按时呈交财务申报表并及时通知证监会指定的事项。
• 代币纳入及检讨委员会：设立代币纳入及检讨委员会，订立、实施及执行平台虚拟资产买卖准则，并负责披露、记录和向董事会汇报。
• 尽职审查：平台运营者应对任何将纳入平台买卖的虚拟资产事先进行所有合理的尽职审查。
• 预防市场操纵与违规监测：平台营运者应建立监测、违规识别与市场监察的内部政策和措施，至少能识别及侦测异常情况，监察及预防违规交易，发现操纵或违规活动后立即采取措施以限制或暂停买卖；平台营运者应采用由信誉良好的独立供应商所提供的有效市场监察系统。
• 与客户进行交易：确保其作出的任何陈述、邀请和提供的任何资料、广告都是准确、及时、完整及不具有误导性的，并保存可审计记录。
• 认识客户的要求：平台营运者应在客户开户时采取一切合理步骤获取客户真实和全部的身份、财政状况、投资经验及投资目标，以便进行风险承受评估、客户分类与限额管理。
• 保管客户资产要求：客户资产与自有资产严格分离，由关联实体以信托形式持有；建立及落实线上及线下的分层储存（至少98%的客户虚拟资产应以线下方式储存）、确保安全地产生, 储存及备份所有加密种子及私人密钥、客户资金及利息入账、常设授权指示等书面内部政策及管治程序。
• 反洗钱与记录保存/报送：依规履行尽职审查/持续汇报/记录保存与可疑交易监测；持牌人、平台营运者、关联实体的所有董事及员工均应熟悉AMLO的规定并遵从廉政公署发出的有关指引。

 

• 稳定币发行人牌照监管

 

• 适用范围

 

香港法例第656 章《稳定币条例》已于2025年8月1日生效。根据《稳定币条例》，凡在香港发行“指明稳定币”（specified stablecoin），或在香港以外地区发行以港币为参考的指明稳定币，都属于受规管稳定币活动，必须向金管局申请牌照。“指明稳定币”是指锚定一种或多种官方货币，或其他金管局指明的计算单位或经济价值储存形式以维持稳定价值的数字代币。具体来说，以下情况均需申请稳定币发行牌照：

1. 在香港发行以一种或多种官方货币为参考的稳定币；
2. 在香港以外发行以港币为参考、且在商业运营中的稳定币；
3. 任何被金管局指定为需受规管的其他稳定币活动。

此外，积极在香港或其他地区向公众宣传稳定币相关业务，也被视为“持牌活动”，同样需要申请牌照。未获得牌照而进行上述稳定币发行活动，属于违法行为，可能被处以罚款和刑事处罚。

• 稳定币发行牌照申请基本要求

 稳定币发行与相关服务的牌照门槛采用“牌照先行”的事前监管模式，金管局及证监会在2025年8月14日发布的联合声明中明确强调将以金融稳定+消费者保护为核心目标，采取严格及审慎的态度审批稳定币发行人的牌照申请，门槛甚高。除《稳定币条例》，稳定币监管还需关注金管局在2025年7月29日发布的配套文件：《持牌稳定币发行人监管指引》，《打击洗钱及恐怖分子资金筹集指引（持牌稳定币发行人适用）》，与发牌制度及申请程序相关的《稳定币发行人发牌制度摘要说明》，《原有稳定币发行人过渡条文摘要说明》。纵观上述文件可得稳定币发牌基本要求包括如下要点：

• 申请主体：申请者须是在香港成立的公司或在香港以外成立为法团的认可机构。
• 最低实缴股本或财务资源：申请人必须始终保持不少于港币25,000,000的实缴股本，或以其他可自由兑换为港币的货币（经金管局批准）等值金额；或经金管局批准的其他财务资源达到或超过上述金额。该部分财务资源仅可用于稳定币相关业务，不得与关联公司、股东、董事或高级管理层进行交易或挪用。
• 储备资产管理：每种拟发行的稳定币类型都必须有独立的储备资产池，并与其他资产池分隔。储备资产需由合资格托管人（如持牌银行或经金管局认可的资产托管人）保管。储备资产的市值必须始终不少于流通中稳定币的面值，并建议适度超额抵押以应对风险。储备资产应为高质量、高流动性、低投资风险的资产，并通过信托安排与发行人其他资产分隔，确保稳定币持有人在发行人破产时可优先索偿。
• 风险管理与审计：申请人需建立完善的储备资产风险管理政策和程序，确保储备资产能及时满足赎回请求。储备资产需定期由合资格且独立的外部审计师进行核查和审计，并向公众披露储备管理政策、风险评估、储备资产组成及市场价值，以及独立审计结果。
• 赎回机制：稳定币持有人有权按面值赎回稳定币。赎回请求应在一个工作日内处理，不得收取不合理费用或附加过度苛刻条件。
• 利息与收益：发行人不得向持有人支付利息等类存款性质的回报。储备资产管理产生的收益或损失归发行人所有。
• 适当人选：申请人及其高管（包括首席执行官、董事、稳定币经理、控权人等）必须是“适当人选”，即具备良好品格、声誉、诚信、专业能力和相关经验，并须获得金管局的同意方可担任该职位。
• 科技风险管理：申请人还应配套完善的科技风险管理，包括建立完善的私钥生命周期管理制度、智能合约审计等。
• 业务持续与退出计划：申请人需制定业务恢复和有序退出计划，确保在重大运营中断时能及时恢复关键功能，并有详细的业务退出程序。
• 合规与反洗钱要求：申请人需建立健全的信息与会计系统、信息披露与报告机制、个人资料保护措施及投诉处理机制。还需进行机构风险评估，确保业务符合反洗钱及反恐怖融资法规。

 

• 虚拟资产交易及托管服务商牌照（公众咨询中的新框架）

2025年6月，香港财经事务及库务局和证监会联合发布了公众咨询文件，分别就虚拟资产交易服务提供者和虚拟资产托管服务提供者设立新监管制度的立法建议征询意见。

• 拟议监管范围

《有关规管虚拟资产交易的立法建议》公众咨询文件中建议，凡是在香港从事涉及虚拟资产与任何金钱之间的转换的现货交易服务，均须向证监会申请牌照或注册。如业务过程牵涉法定货币汇款服务，持牌人除须持有虚拟资产场外交易牌照外，亦须持有金钱服务经营者牌照。这一涵盖范围非常广泛，适用于通过实体店或在线平台提供的各类虚拟资产交易服务，包括：简单的兑换买卖，以及更复杂的服务（例如经纪活动、大宗交易活动和顾问或资产经理从事的其他相关活动）。这意味着过去许多无需牌照的场外交易商、兑换店、自助柜员机运营商等灰色地带都将被纳入监管。

《有关规管虚拟资产托管服务的立法建议》公众咨询文件将虚拟资产托管服务定义为“以业务形式代客户保管 (i) 虚拟资产；或 (ii) 能转移客户虚拟资产的工具，包括但不限於私人密钥”。就监管职责而言，其发牌制度的监管架构与虚拟资产交易服务一致。简言之，证监会管标准和发牌及注册，金管局作为银行及储值支付工具的虚拟资产托管活动的前线监管机构。

• 申请牌照的基本要求

拟监管对投资者保障、风险管理与市场发展的关注贯穿始终。申请成为虚拟资产交易服务提供者或虚拟资产托管服务提供者所需满足要求的具体口径还应以后续规则为准，两份咨询文件中的拟议监管要点如下：

	虚拟资产交易服务发牌要求	虚拟资产托管服务发牌要求
资格	持牌人须为在本地成立并有固定营运地点的公司，或在其他地方成立但在香港根据香港法例第622章《公司条例》注册的公司。
代币纳入及风险监测	大致遵循适用于虚拟资产交易平台的规定，除遵守其他规定外，持牌人或注册人亦须设立一个代币纳入及检讨委员会，负责订立、实施和执行有关纳入任何虚拟资产以供买卖／撤销虚拟资产买卖的准则；须就其为客户进行的虚拟资产交易实施有效的交易监察程序、风险管理政策和程序；应采取措施确保投资者获得保障，例如为客户进行虚拟资产知识评估、向客户提供足够培训、为客户进行风险评估和厘定风险状况、设定客户风险上限、确保客户适合投资虚拟资产，以及防止、避免和披露实际或潜在的利益冲突。	持牌或注册虚拟资产托管服务提供者应制定适当并与其业务规模和复杂程度相称的风险管理政策和程序；须采用适当的科技方案（例如区块链分析工具），以便能够追踪虚拟资产和相关钱包地址，以及识别潜在可疑交易。
尽职审查及信息储存	持牌人或注册人应对所有拟纳入供买卖的虚拟资产进行合理的尽职审查；须遵守AMLO附录2中储存记录的要求。	不对可托管的虚拟资产类别施加任何限制，前提是虚拟资产托管服务提供者必须对有关代币进行稳妥的尽职审查，确保能妥善管理洗钱及恐怖分子资金筹集风险。
	持牌人或注册人须提交多方面的资料（例如有关其业务过程中所使用的钱包地址、持牌人所经营或将会经营的业务范围和性质，以及所提供或将会提供的服务类别的详情），并确保所提交的为最新资料；妥善储存所有交易、资金流向、业务经营记录。
交易及资产处理	持牌人或注册人如要在其钱包地址存入／提取客户的虚拟资产（包括为结算目的而在第三方存入／提取虚拟资产），则必须确保完全遵从与打击洗钱及恐怖分子资金筹集相关的适用标准及其他规定；获证监会发牌或注册的中介人须确保其虚拟资产交易活动是透过获证监会发牌的虚拟资产交易平台上开立及维持的综合帐户进行，而且只会在该平台为客户执行交易；获证监会发牌的虚拟资产交易平台则须确保其客户的虚拟资产是透过信托方式存放于由其有联系实体开立的钱包地址；持牌人或注册人应妥善保障其客户资产，并采取额外措施，包括妥善分隔客户资产，以及将客户的虚拟资产交予香港的持牌或注册虚拟资产托管人保管。
财政资源	持牌人或注册人（除银行）应具备足够财政资源，用以经营其虚拟资产业务。财政资源规定包括500万港元的最低缴足股本、高达300万港元的最低规定速动资金（视乎业务模式而定），以及相等于至少12个月实际营运开支的额外规定速动资金。	除银行外，持牌或注册虚拟资产托管服务提供者须具备1,000万港元的最低缴足股本和高达300万港元的最低规定速动资金（参考SFO规定，最终需视乎业务模式而定）；可能有额外的财务资源要求，例如与经营开支、业务活动规模、赔偿和保险安排、托管基础设施以及内部控制要求等要求。
	应遵守订明的审计及披露要求，并提交经审计的帐目。
适当人选及胜任能力	持牌人或注册人须建立良好的企业管治架构，其职员须具备所需的知识、经验和资格，以便有效履行职责。申请人必须符合适当人选标准。适当人选考量标准包括该人曾否在任何地方被裁定犯洗钱及恐怖分子资金筹集、欺诈、舞弊或不诚实作为有关的罪行；该人曾否不遵从或有可能不遵从打击洗钱及恐怖分子资金筹集规定或其他适用于持牌虚拟资产托管服务提供者的规管要求；该人的经验和相关资历；以及该人是否信誉良好和财政稳健（例如该人并非破产或清盘程序的标的）。
		适当人选规定将适用于提供虚拟资产托管服务的企业实体的所有大股东，以及为该等实体执行虚拟资产托管职能的个人。申请人须委任最少两名获证监会核准的负责人员（或两名获金管局核准的主管人员，视乎情况而定）。持牌的虚拟资产托管服务提供者的所有执行董事必须是证监会核准的负责人员。
业务操守	持牌人或注册人须以诚实及公平态度，并以适当技能、审慎及勤勉尽责，以及维护客户利益及市场稳健的方式行事，并遵从适用于其业务活动经营的所有法定及规管要求。

 

结语

综观香港虚拟资产监管框架，从证券型虚拟资产的监管，到AMLO体系下的交易平台牌照，再到新近推出的稳定币发行人牌照以及正在咨询中的虚拟资产交易及托管服务商牌照制度，香港正在构建一个全方位、多层次的虚拟资产监管体系。

我们在下表对目前已经生效的监管机制进行简要的对比，以便利读者的理解。

监管法例	覆盖范围	监管机构	牌照类型
SFO	证券型虚拟资产、代币化证券	证监会 / 金管局（银行部分）	1/4/7/9 号及其升级
AMLO	非证券型虚拟资产的交易平台	证监会	VATP 牌照
稳定币条例	指明稳定币的发行及管理	金管局	稳定币发行人牌照

鉴于香港虚拟资产监管体系的专业性和复杂性，我们建议任何计划在香港开展虚拟资产相关业务的机构或个人，都应当在业务规划初期即寻求专业法律顾问的协助。在香港这样一个强调法治和合规的国际金融中心，专业的法律支持是虚拟资产业务成功落地的重要保障。

本文由合伙人劳恒晃律师﹑张源辉律师﹑曾浩贤律师﹑刘砚枫律师﹑谢庆伦顾问律师和黄虹博士共同合著。若阁下想了解更多详情，请联络我们的合伙人劳恒晃律师﹑张源辉律师﹑曾浩贤律师﹑刘砚枫律师或谢庆伦顾问律师。

本新闻简讯更新仅供参考。其内容不构成亦不应视为法律咨询意见。史蒂文生黄律师事务所不会就任何因倚赖本处所载资料而作出的决定丶采取的行动或不采取的行动所引致的或与之有关的任何特别丶间接或相应而生的损失或损害向阁下承担法律责任。

[1] 虚拟资产质押（Staking）服务是指持牌法团或注册机构代其客户进行涉及承诺或锁定客户虚拟资产的过程的任何活动，以便根据权益证明共识机制参与区块链协议的验证程序，并享有因参与该程序而产生及分派的回报。

[2] 参见《香港数字资产发展政策宣言2.0》<https://gia.info.gov.hk/general/202506/26/P2025062500847_500091_1_1750909590100.pdf>。

[3] 参见《虚拟资产交易平台名单》< https://sc.sfc.hk/TuniS/www.sfc.hk/TC/Welcome-to-the-Fintech-Contact-Point/Virtual-assets/Virtual-asset-trading-platforms-operators/Lists-of-virtual-asset-trading-platforms>。

[4] 适用于法团的判断标准包括但不限于其业务、企业管治、内部监控、营运审查、风险管理及合规，以及其高级管理层及其他员工所具备的总体胜任能力；适用于个人的判断标准包括但不限于其具备所需的学历、专业或行业资格，拥有足够的相关行业及管理经验（如适用），对监管架构（包括规管虚拟资产行业的法例、规则及有关守则）有充足的认识，熟悉金融从业人员应具备的职业道德操守。