背景

仲裁条例第81(4)条列明 “凡原讼法庭根据藉第(1)款而具有效力的《贸法委示范法》第34条作出决定，则须获原讼法庭许可，方可针对该决定提出上诉。”

在China International Fund Ltd v Dennis Lau & Ng Chun Man Architects & Engineers (HK) Ltd (2015) HKEC 1626 一案中，上诉庭就第81(4)条的合宪性作出考虑。

申请人于本案中申请许可上诉原诉庭法官的裁决(原讼庭法官驳回了申请人的撤销仲裁裁决申请)。被申请人提出基于第81(4)条上诉庭并无权批准许可，而申请人则指出该条文并不合宪，基于此不符比例地局限了终审法院的最终仲裁权 (按照基本法第82条)。

裁决

上诉庭裁定纵然第81(4)条有表面终局性，上诉庭拥有剩余权力监督原诉法庭的行事，这是在下级法庭不予许可决定不能被视作司法决定的少数情况下的补救方法。

上诉庭亦裁定第81(4)条就原讼庭是否准予许可施加了终局性，但这是受限于上诉庭上述的剩余权力。上诉庭裁定若然允许多次申请，以仲裁解决争议的合理目标(即终局性、节省时间及费用)将会被大打节扣。再者，第81(4)条的规限，被裁定为不是多于必需以达致上述的合理目标。

Robotunits Pty Ltd v Juergen Karl Mennel (2015) VSC 268 是一宗在澳洲维多利亚州最高法院有关股东纠纷的案件。

被告人申请搁置诉讼及将案件以仲裁处理，基于当事方同意以仲裁处理双方纠纷。被告人尝试依据经修订股东协议中的第15(2)条的仲裁协议：

“每当事方均不可撤回及无条件地按照维多利亚法律法学会的仲裁指引进行仲裁。”

此条款能否构成有效的仲裁协议？Croft法官裁定仲裁协议表面上是不具争议地具有瑕疵，因为当中所指的 “维多利亚法律法学会的仲裁指引” 并不存在，亦看来从来不曾存在。申索人承认该协议可通过司法协助获得效力。Croft法官裁定第15(2)条的明显用词证明了当事方将争议通过仲裁解决的明显意图。因此，法庭裁定仲裁协议有效及足以构成被告人申索之命令的基础。

Croft法官裁定应该搁置整个诉讼，但只将股东协议有否提供法律或权衡基础予被告人促使申索人作出股份支付的问题交由仲裁解决。法庭进一步裁定由于仲裁协议具有瑕疵，作出上述命令的条件是当事方于28天内尝试同意仲裁的地点及仲裁规则。

2015年8月22日， 史蒂文生黄律师事务所中国发展区域主管杨颂雅女士应邀参加由FWD富卫保险香港总部举办的海外配置与保护讲座，以第一嘉宾的身份为到场30多位的高级保险理财师分享了海外资产配置与保护讲座，主要以家族信托主线结合海外寿险的形式展开介绍，理财师就寿险在海外配置及保护的运用上分享交流了不同意见。

如阁下有任何关于此活动的查询或想了解更多详情，请联络本所杨颂雅女士。

2015年8月21日， 史蒂文生黄律师事务所中国发展区域主管杨颂雅女士以高级导师身份参加由中国银行财富管理与私人银行举办第二届高级客户经理培训，此次会议举办地是在避暑胜地冰城举行，史蒂文生黄律师事务所连续两年与中国银行总行合作，上一年培训举办地点在武夷山和南京，这次参会人员主要是来自中国银行各地分行的综合客户经理，高级客户经理助理及各分行行长，培训主要讲述了财富保全与家族信托设立的基本架构，现场反应热烈。

如阁下有任何关于此活动的查询或想了解更多详情，请联络本所杨颂雅女士。

(English) In Beijing Tong Gang Da Sheng Trade Co Ltd v Allen & Overy [2015] 3 HKLRD 247, the Court of Appeal maintained the lower court decision that a litigation funding agreement and assignment of a cause of action were champertous.

Background

The Defendants, a solicitors’ firm and a barrister respectively, were alleged to have provided negligent advice to a company (the Company) in about 2005 or 2006. The Plaintiff and the Company entered into a funding agreement whereby the Plaintiff agreed, inter alia, to lend $3.4 million to the Company at an interest rate of 25% for a term of 2 years for an intended litigation against the Defendants, guaranteed by the proceeds that the Company would recover from the Defendants, and entitling the Plaintiff to 20% of such proceeds. After the Company issued writs against the Defendant, the Company assigned to the Plaintiff the cause of action against the Defendant and, inter alia, the right to the proceeds arising from such action for $100,000 and 10% of the net proceeds of the action. The Defendants challenged that the assignment was champertous. The Plaintiff argued that it was a major creditor of the Company and its controlling shareholder and so had a genuine commercial interest in the enforcement of action.

Ruling

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the Plaintiff’s contention and upheld the court of first instance’s finding that both the funding agreement and the assignment were champertous. It was held that the Judge below had examined the totality of the facts in forming the views that the transactions would pose a genuine risk to the integrity of the court’s processes. The vastly disproportionate potential returns for the outlay in the funding agreement and the assignment created a serious doubt into the genuineness of the assertions of the Plaintiff.

General Principles on Maintenance and Champerty (as enunciated in the CFA decision Unruh v Seeberger [2007] HKLRD 414)

The core concepts of maintenance of champerty are as follows:
› Maintenance involves a person’s “officious intermeddling” in litigation in which he has no legitimate interest.
› Champerty is a particular kind of maintenance and involves a person taking a share of the proceeds of the litigation maintained.

There are several categories of exceptions:
› The common interest category which justified certain persons with a legitimate common interest in the outcome of litigation in funding it.
› Case involving access to justice considerations.
› A miscellaneous category of practices accepted as lawful including sale and assignment by a trustee in bankruptcy of an action commenced in the bankruptcy and the doctrine of subrogation as applied to contracts of insurance.

In considering whether a contract will be vitiated on the grounds of maintenance and champerty, public policy considerations shall be evaluated in light that:
› The fact that an arrangement may be caught by the broad definition of maintenance of champerty is not in itself sufficient to impose liability. It is necessary to examine the “totality of the facts” and ask whether they pose a genuine risk to the integrity of the court’s processes.
› Countervailing public policies must be taken into account, especially policies in favour of ensuring access to justice and of recognizing, where appropriate, legitimate common interests of a social or commercial character in the litigation.

医务委员会 (“医委会”) 就一名医生 (“W”) 作出公开的纪律研讯。医委会原本裁定只发给W一封警告信，但其后当医委会透过传媒得知W曾有犯规纪录便复核裁决并判处W在普通科医生名册上被除名一个月。医委会于同日的书面裁决指出于将来的纪律研讯，所有被告人的律师代表理应坦白告知医委会有关被告人的犯规纪录。

一名与本案无关的市民 (“N”) 向医委会查询参与纪律研讯的主审成员、医委会的法律顾问及辩方代表律师的身份。医委会多次询问N查询的目的但N拒绝回答。医委会决定拒绝向N披露有关资料 (“医委会决定”)，N便申请司法复核医委会决定。医委会称《个人资料(私隐)条例》(第486章)( “《条例》”) 附表1第3保障资料原则限制向N披露资料。

原讼法庭批准N的申请并撤销医委会决定。林云浩法官指出医委会作出决定时将无关联的第3保障资料原则列入考虑因素亦没有考虑到有关的因素，即「公开公正」的原则。因为如该原则适用，根据《条例》第60B(a)条，有关资料将被豁免而不受第3保障资料原则的条文所管限。

林云浩法官在附带意见亦指出「公开公正」的原则不只局限于在法庭举行的司法聆讯，亦适用于所有行使司法权的审裁机构。基于司法行政及司法制度的问责性涉及的公众利益，参与公开司法聆讯的主要人员身份通常都应被公开。如审裁机构没有在书面裁决列明该资料，审裁机构亦应在收到与聆讯合理地接近的时间提出的查询后披露有关资料。