Hugo Boss Trademark v Britain Boss International Co Ltd [2015] 3 HKLRD 4 一案提醒何谓将不合常规取得的因欠缺行动而作出的判决作废的传统普通法项下的当然权利。

原告人控告一家香港公司及其唯一董事及股东(「该董事」)侵犯商标及假冒。该公司的注册办事处与该董事于周年申报表提供的住址相同(「该地址」)。原告人把两名被告人的令状送达该地址。其中，该董事的令状依照《高等法院规则》(第4章，附属法例A)第10条号命令第1(2)条规则的规定被送往她的「通常或最后为人所知的地址」。实际上，该董事当时通常居于内地。该公司与另一家无任何关连的公司共用办事处，由其秘书拥有，并会把指明两名被告人为收件人的文件转交该董事。然而，虽然传讯令状及因欠缺行动而取得判决的传票分别于2013年11月及2014年1月送达该地址，秘书却在2014年3月才将文件转交该董事。原告人早已于2014年1月因被告人欠缺行动而取得判决。

针对第二被告人的判决由于在不合常规下取得，因而作废。法庭重申在不合常规下取得的判决应理所当然地予以作废。但是这并不代表法庭会忽视围绕涉案争议点的情况，而是指无须探讨抗辩理由的实际是非曲直。法庭因此保留剩余酌情权来决定是否行使该项当然权利，将有关判决作废。

在本案中，该董事于令状送达之时并非身在本司法管辖权范围内。由于第10条号命令第1(2)条规则只限于提供其他送达方式把令状送达身在本司法管辖权范围内的被告人，该董事令状的送达方式不合常规。尽管被告人延误申请将涉案判决作废，而该董事于2014年3月才得悉诉讼的说法存有疑点，但这些因素并不足以支持法庭行使其剩余酌情权拒绝将不合常规的判决作废。

法庭在Bushra Bibi v Method Building & Engineering Works Ltd (No. 2) [2015] 2 HKLRD 402，一宗致命意外的诉讼中，需要裁定就亲属丧亡之痛的损害赔偿判给的利息，应否仍为年息2%。

法庭在处理此类案件时的一贯原则是由于索偿人早应在亲属丧亡时获得赔偿，因此法庭应就他尚未获得款项判给他利息，利息由死亡日期起计，至判决日期为止，除非法庭认为有特别原因而不作出此裁判。此原则亦适用于双方商定赔偿额的情况。

有异于以往只判给年息2%的裁决，原讼法庭在此案中，根据《致命意外条例》(第22章)，裁定就亲属丧亡之痛的损害赔偿判给的利息，将由死亡日期至最终判决日期为止，案法定每年利率8%计算。此利息同时适用于一次性的开支，如殡殓费等。

合同关系不涉及第三人原则的重点，在于只有合约当事方能执行相关合约。

为了放宽此不合时原则的某些范畴，各个司法管辖权区已实施了提供第三者权利的法律条文，包括香港在内。香港法例第 623章《合约(第三者权利)条例》将于2016年1月1日正式生效，使第三者能够以较为直接的方法行使其权利。

第三者可在合约明文规定 (第623章第4(1)(a)条)或合约看来是赋予该第三者一项利益的情况下(第623章第4(1)(b)条)执行该份合约。

第623章第6条订明合约当事方不可在无第三者同意下藉协议更改或撤销该合约以致改动或终绝该第三者在该条款之下的任何权利。

在英国，商业交易下的一般情况是排除此等第三者权利。然而，在某些范畴下并未有排除1999年合约法(第三者权利)，如在并购交易背景下。

例如，当卖方同意不竞争但未能遵守此约束性契诺，此或导致买方的集团公司蒙受损失。因此，受英国法例管辖的合约一般均利用1999年合约法(第三者权利)下的权利直接执行约束性契诺。

以上例子显示尽管在英国一般商业交易下会排除1999年合约法(第三者权利)，当事方亦因小心考虑交易背景及情况，决定应否采用此一般性的商业决定。

背景

仲裁条例第81(4)条列明 “凡原讼法庭根据藉第(1)款而具有效力的《贸法委示范法》第34条作出决定，则须获原讼法庭许可，方可针对该决定提出上诉。”

在China International Fund Ltd v Dennis Lau & Ng Chun Man Architects & Engineers (HK) Ltd (2015) HKEC 1626 一案中，上诉庭就第81(4)条的合宪性作出考虑。

申请人于本案中申请许可上诉原诉庭法官的裁决(原讼庭法官驳回了申请人的撤销仲裁裁决申请)。被申请人提出基于第81(4)条上诉庭并无权批准许可，而申请人则指出该条文并不合宪，基于此不符比例地局限了终审法院的最终仲裁权 (按照基本法第82条)。

裁决

上诉庭裁定纵然第81(4)条有表面终局性，上诉庭拥有剩余权力监督原诉法庭的行事，这是在下级法庭不予许可决定不能被视作司法决定的少数情况下的补救方法。

上诉庭亦裁定第81(4)条就原讼庭是否准予许可施加了终局性，但这是受限于上诉庭上述的剩余权力。上诉庭裁定若然允许多次申请，以仲裁解决争议的合理目标(即终局性、节省时间及费用)将会被大打节扣。再者，第81(4)条的规限，被裁定为不是多于必需以达致上述的合理目标。

Robotunits Pty Ltd v Juergen Karl Mennel (2015) VSC 268 是一宗在澳洲维多利亚州最高法院有关股东纠纷的案件。

被告人申请搁置诉讼及将案件以仲裁处理，基于当事方同意以仲裁处理双方纠纷。被告人尝试依据经修订股东协议中的第15(2)条的仲裁协议：

“每当事方均不可撤回及无条件地按照维多利亚法律法学会的仲裁指引进行仲裁。”

此条款能否构成有效的仲裁协议？Croft法官裁定仲裁协议表面上是不具争议地具有瑕疵，因为当中所指的 “维多利亚法律法学会的仲裁指引” 并不存在，亦看来从来不曾存在。申索人承认该协议可通过司法协助获得效力。Croft法官裁定第15(2)条的明显用词证明了当事方将争议通过仲裁解决的明显意图。因此，法庭裁定仲裁协议有效及足以构成被告人申索之命令的基础。

Croft法官裁定应该搁置整个诉讼，但只将股东协议有否提供法律或权衡基础予被告人促使申索人作出股份支付的问题交由仲裁解决。法庭进一步裁定由于仲裁协议具有瑕疵，作出上述命令的条件是当事方于28天内尝试同意仲裁的地点及仲裁规则。

(English) In Beijing Tong Gang Da Sheng Trade Co Ltd v Allen & Overy [2015] 3 HKLRD 247, the Court of Appeal maintained the lower court decision that a litigation funding agreement and assignment of a cause of action were champertous.

Background

The Defendants, a solicitors’ firm and a barrister respectively, were alleged to have provided negligent advice to a company (the Company) in about 2005 or 2006. The Plaintiff and the Company entered into a funding agreement whereby the Plaintiff agreed, inter alia, to lend $3.4 million to the Company at an interest rate of 25% for a term of 2 years for an intended litigation against the Defendants, guaranteed by the proceeds that the Company would recover from the Defendants, and entitling the Plaintiff to 20% of such proceeds. After the Company issued writs against the Defendant, the Company assigned to the Plaintiff the cause of action against the Defendant and, inter alia, the right to the proceeds arising from such action for $100,000 and 10% of the net proceeds of the action. The Defendants challenged that the assignment was champertous. The Plaintiff argued that it was a major creditor of the Company and its controlling shareholder and so had a genuine commercial interest in the enforcement of action.

Ruling

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the Plaintiff’s contention and upheld the court of first instance’s finding that both the funding agreement and the assignment were champertous. It was held that the Judge below had examined the totality of the facts in forming the views that the transactions would pose a genuine risk to the integrity of the court’s processes. The vastly disproportionate potential returns for the outlay in the funding agreement and the assignment created a serious doubt into the genuineness of the assertions of the Plaintiff.

General Principles on Maintenance and Champerty (as enunciated in the CFA decision Unruh v Seeberger [2007] HKLRD 414)

The core concepts of maintenance of champerty are as follows:
› Maintenance involves a person’s “officious intermeddling” in litigation in which he has no legitimate interest.
› Champerty is a particular kind of maintenance and involves a person taking a share of the proceeds of the litigation maintained.

There are several categories of exceptions:
› The common interest category which justified certain persons with a legitimate common interest in the outcome of litigation in funding it.
› Case involving access to justice considerations.
› A miscellaneous category of practices accepted as lawful including sale and assignment by a trustee in bankruptcy of an action commenced in the bankruptcy and the doctrine of subrogation as applied to contracts of insurance.

In considering whether a contract will be vitiated on the grounds of maintenance and champerty, public policy considerations shall be evaluated in light that:
› The fact that an arrangement may be caught by the broad definition of maintenance of champerty is not in itself sufficient to impose liability. It is necessary to examine the “totality of the facts” and ask whether they pose a genuine risk to the integrity of the court’s processes.
› Countervailing public policies must be taken into account, especially policies in favour of ensuring access to justice and of recognizing, where appropriate, legitimate common interests of a social or commercial character in the litigation.