史蒂文生黄律师事务所（与锦天城（香港）律师事务所有限法律责任合伙联营）作为深圳海清智元科技股份有限公司（「海清智元科技」）（1392.HK）的香港法律顾问，助力海清智元科技于香港联合交易所有限公司（「香港联交所」）主板成功挂牌上市。

海清智元科技股份于2026年6月22日在香港联交所正式上市。海清智元科技共发售85,162,500股H股，其中8,516,500股H股及76,646,000股H股分別为香港公开发售股份及国际配售股份。以每股港币7.20元的发售价，公司的市值为港币55.743亿元。全球发售所得款项总额约为港币6.1317亿元。

海清智元科技及其附属公司（「集团」）为中国领先的多光谱AI技术企业。自成立以来，集团依托在多光谱感知与AI算法领域的自研技术提供能够探测人眼可见及不可见的光谱信息的产品及服务。集团的解决方案实现更高维度的感知与安全监测，为多种主要从事软件和信息技术服务、电子产品、互联网数据中心（IDC）、智驾系统、电信运营商、物联网（IoT）系统集成及建设相关业务超过2,500位的客户提供有关泛安全与智能感知的额外信息决策。

本发行上市项目的联席保荐人为民银资本有限公司以及浦银国际融资有限公司。整体协调人为民银证券有限公司、浦银国际融资有限公司以及利弗莫尔证券有限公司。

本所团队由合伙人张源辉律师领导，团队成员包括吴梓爗高级律师、黎明基律师、黄河律师及陈芷欣实习律师。

如阁下有任何关于此交易的查询或想了解更多详情，请联络本所张源辉律师。

史蒂文生黄律师事务所欣然宣布，本所于 《Benchmark Litigation》2026亚太年度争议解决榜单中再次获得认可，体现了本所在诉讼及争议解决领域持续稳定的专业表现。

在本年度榜单中，本所于以下五个业务领域获得排名：

• 商业及交易争议
  • 破产及重组
  • 白领犯罪
  • 家事及婚姻
  • 私人客户

此次入选不仅反映了本所在处理多元化争议事项方面的经验，亦彰显了本所团队在商业纠纷、破产清盘、监管及刑事风险、以及私人客户事务等领域的综合法律服务能力。

作为一家具备深厚本地经验并熟悉跨境法律事务的香港律师事务所，本所一直致力于为企业、个人、家族及私人客户提供务实、周全及具策略性的法律方案。我们很高兴本所的争议解决团队再次获得国际法律评级机构的肯定。

关于 Benchmark Litigation

Benchmark Litigation 是专注于诉讼及争议解决领域的国际法律评级指南。其亚太地区榜单通过独立调研、市场访谈、客户反馈、同行评价以及对相关案件工作的分析，评选出区内具代表性的律师事务所及法律从业人员。

本所谨此感谢客户及业界同仁一直以来的信任与支持。

如有任何查询或需要进一步资料，欢迎联系本所郑炎潘律师、徐凯怡律师、刘俊明律师、黎嘉钿律师、叶小铃律师、刘嘉熙律师或梁祺澧律师。

请点击此处查看完整榜单。

史蒂文生黄律师事务所欣然宣布，本所再次获《Benchmark Litigation》 认可。《Benchmark Litigation》 是亚太地区诉讼及争议解决领域具影响力的法律评级指南之一。

在 2025 年度榜单中，本所于以下五个业务领域获得排名：

• 商业及交易争议
• 破产及重组
• 白领犯罪
• 家事及婚姻
• 私人客户

此次持续获得认可，体现了本所在争议解决领域的专业实力及团队深度，亦反映了本所为个人、家族、私人客户及企业客户处理各类争议及复杂法律事务方面的丰富经验。

关于 Benchmark Litigation

Benchmark Litigation 是专注于诉讼及争议解决领域的专业法律评级刊物。其亚太地区榜单乃基于独立调研，包括市场分析、与诉讼律师、仲裁员及争议解决专业人士的访谈、客户反馈、同行评议，以及对近期案件工作的评估。

本所衷心感谢客户及业界同仁一直以来的支持与认可。

如有任何查询或需要进一步资料，欢迎联系本所郑炎潘律师、徐凯怡律师或刘俊明律师。

请点击此处查看完整榜单。

If you have been following the financial news, you might have noticed that the legal walls are closing in on Andrew Left, the founder of Citron Research.

On 1 June 2026, a federal jury in Los Angeles convicted the 55-year-old activist short-seller on 13 of 17 counts of securities fraud. Left faces a theoretical maximum of decades in prison at his upcoming sentencing in August.

Left’s downfall offers a perfect moment to reflect on a grand financial irony. It is a tale of two jurisdictions, a spectacular property collapse, and a downfall that threatens to deepen a pre-existing public hostility and misunderstanding towards the practice of short-selling itself.
 

1. The Hong Kong Time Machine: The Evergrande Prophecy

To understand the tragedy and comedy of Andrew Left, we have to travel back to 2012, when Left targeted a titan of the Chinese real estate market: China Evergrande Group.

In a research report, Citron Research asserted that Evergrande was fundamentally insolvent and accused it of using fraudulent accounting tricks to mask its massive debts. The result of this early whistleblowing?

• The Reaction: Evergrande’s stock temporarily tumbled, and the company vehemently denied the claims.
• The Retaliation: The Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) took a dim view of Left’s aggressive tactics. Instead of investigating Evergrande, they investigated Left.
• The Ban: In 2016, Hong Kong’s Market Misconduct Tribunal found Left guilty of spreading false or misleading information (Citron’s report was based, in turn, on an anonymous report sent to Left). He was banned from trading in the Hong Kong market for five years, ordered to disgorge his profits, and forced to pay hefty legal fees.

 The Vindication: A Decade Too Late

Fast forward to the 2020s. Evergrande collapsed under a staggering $300 billion mountain of debt, triggering a systemic crisis in Chinese real estate. In 2024, a Hong Kong court ordered the company’s liquidation.

Adding the ultimate layer of irony, Evergrande’s liquidators are now threatening massive legal claims against PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the company’s former auditor, for failing to sound the alarm on the property giant’s catastrophic books.

So, does Andrew Left deserve vindication?

In the court of public opinion, perhaps. The Hong Kong regulators essentially shot the messenger and sent the opposite signal to the market.
 

2. The US Downfall: The Art of the “U-Turn”

If Left was a prophetic hero in Hong Kong, why is he currently awaiting sentencing in Los Angeles?

The key difference lies in his trading behaviour. In Hong Kong, the issue was whether his analysis of Evergrande was fundamentally honest. In the US, the Department of Justice and the SEC proved that Left was running a sophisticated “bait-and-switch” scheme.

According to prosecutors, Left’s business model wasn’t just about publishing research. It was about using his broad digital reach and television appearances to move stock prices in the short term, and then immediately doing a “U-turn” trade:

 Public Posture = Ultra-Bearish (or Bullish)

==> Actual Action = Secretly exit position within minutes

Crucially, several of the trades that sealed Left’s fate did not even involve short-selling. Instead, they were classic, long-side “pump-and-dump” manoeuvres. Left would quietly accumulate long positions, hype them to his followers to drive the price up, and then immediately dump his holdings at a premium.

Left wasn’t convicted because he was a short-seller. He was convicted because he was telling his followers to head for the exits while he was secretly sneaking back inside to buy up the discounted goods, or pumping shares he was already quietly selling.

 The Great Misconception: Are Short-Sellers Actually “Evil”?

The public generally despises short-sellers. We are conditioned to favour builders and optimists. When a stock price goes up, everyone wins (or so we assume). When a short-seller arrives, they are viewed as market cynics profiteering from corporate distress.

A few years ago, I was invited to deliver a seminar entitled “How to Tackle Short-Sellers”. The audience, largely comprised of corporate executives, expected a tactical playbook of defensive manoeuvres.

When I commented that the most effective defence was simply to be honest with their financial data and ready to rebuke a short-selling report — pointing out that the SFC can ultimately only prosecute for the dissemination of false or misleading information — the reception was remarkably poor. It was a telling moment. To many in the corporate establishment, the short-seller is the harbinger of doom, an existential threat to be silenced, rather than a mirror reflecting their own structural flaws.

But this emotional bias ignores a fundamental law of economic hygiene: every healthy market needs its sceptics, and price discovery requires friction.

 Why Short-Selling is Crucial for Markets

• Exposing Corporate Fraud: Regulators are not omnipotent. Activist short-sellers, motivated by the pursuit of profit, have the time and financial incentive to dig through hundreds of pages of complex financial statements. Without short-sellers, historic frauds like Enron would have survived much longer, causing far greater ultimate damage.
• Providing Market Liquidity and Preventing Bubbles: When speculative buying dominates, asset prices detach from reality. Short-sellers act as the economic “brakes.” By selling borrowed shares, they absorb excess demand, temper irrational exuberance, and help prevent catastrophic asset bubbles from growing to a size that threatens the wider financial system.
• Price Discovery: A market with only buyers is not a market; it’s a cheerleading squad. For valuations to be “fair,” there must be a mechanism for bearish voices to express their dissent with real capital.

 Conclusion: Don’t Throw the Bear Out with the Bathwater

The real tragedy of Left’s fall is that it will almost certainly deepen public and regulatory hostility towards short-selling. By conflating one man’s manipulative, long-side deceit with a vital market mechanism, we risk feeding the popular narrative that short-selling itself is a corrupt enterprise.

As Left prepares for his sentencing on 31 August 2026, regulators and the public must learn the right lesson from his trial. The target of our anger should be market manipulation and deceit, not the practice of short-selling itself.

After all, a market without short-sellers is like a house without a smoke detector: quieter, perhaps, but infinitely more vulnerable to a sudden, catastrophic fire while you sleep.

Dominic Lau

本次讲座聚焦高净值人群的核心诉求，为到场嘉宾全面解析了现代财富传承的多元化工具与前沿政策。

在讲座中，罗律师系统介绍了遗嘱、持久授权书及信托等常见传承工具，并重点阐述了信托在资产保护与家族传承中的独特优势。他还详细拆解了信托架构中的核心角色，深入探讨了信托契约与意愿书的功能、信托架构的设计、设立地点与适用法律的选择，以及落地所需的关键文件与后续管理要点。罗律师还分享了家族办公室的定义，并重点解读了香港《税务条例》附表16E下，家族投资控权工具（FIHV）所享有的零税率利好政策。

在案例分享环节，罗律师以案说法，揭示了张兰案中信托的不当操作及过量的控制权对信托的资产保护作用的严重影响，亦分享了欠缺合理传承规划可能带来的多重风险，如可能导致遗等产承办困难、家人经济负担以及内地和欧洲各国强制继承规则带来的纠纷等。

本次活动吸引了众多高净值人士、家族企业代表及财富管理从业者莅临参与。现场座无虚席，互动气氛热烈，与会嘉宾对罗律师务实、专业的分享给予了高度评价。

香港联合交易所有限公司（「联交所」）于2026年5月19日发布纪律行动声明，对杭州启明医疗器械股份有限公司（股份代号：2500）（「该上市公司」）的前公司秘书采取纪律行动。

一、案件摘要

 该上市公司聘请企业服务供应商（「服务商」）提供公司秘书服务，包括就遵守《香港联合交易所有限公司证券上市规则》（「《上市规则》」）提供意见、审阅中期报告及年度报告等企业文件，并委派按《上市规则》第3.28条的合资格公司秘书。服务商指派注册会计师黄伟超先生（「黄先生」）担任该角色。黄先生于2021年1月18日获委任为该上市公司之联席公司秘书。

2020年1月至2023年6月期间，该上市公司向其两名执行董事提供未经授权的财务资助，总额约人民币24.77亿元（「违规交易」），因而违反《上市规则》。其间，黄先生曾收到2021及2022财政年度的业绩公告及年报草稿，相关文件明确提及违规交易；惟黄先生未有亲自审阅，亦未就违规交易及其潜在《上市规则》影响向董事会提出质询。黄先生将公司秘书职责委托予服务商同事处理，而该等同事仅提供宏观及文书层面的意见，致使董事会未能获悉违规交易及相关《上市规则》合规风险。

联交所上市委员会（「上市委员会」）裁定，黄先生未能履行公司秘书职责。就违规交易违反《上市规则》第十三、十四及十四A章有关汇报、公告、通函及独立股东批准的规定，黄先生须依据《上市规则》第2A.10B(3)条就该上市公司的违规行为承担责任。上市委员会认为，倘若黄先生亲自审阅相关文件、识别并评估潜在《上市规则》违规风险，并向董事会提供专业意见，有关违规本可避免或及早纠正。上市委员会同时指出，公司秘书一职属个人任命，外聘律师及核数师的参与，不能免除黄先生作为联席公司秘书的专业职责。

本案是联交所首次仅针对一名人士以公司秘书的唯一身份（未在该上市公司同时担任其他职务，例如董事或财务总监）采取的纪律行动，具有标志性意义。

二、对上市公司秘书的执业提示

 本案确立之关键法律原则

本案的裁决核心并非公司秘书「知情不报」，而是其「应知而未知」的疏忽已构成失职。上市委员会明确否定以下两项常见抗辩理由：

• 「委派即免责」：即使已将职能委托予服务团队，根据《上市规则》第28条，公司秘书的任命属个人性质，仍须亲自运用专业判断审阅关键文件。本案中，黄先生仅透过电邮监督，未亲自审阅载有违规交易的业绩草稿，被裁定违反其尽责义务。
• 「依赖专业顾问」：声称依赖核数师或外部律师的意见，并不能免除公司秘书自身的监察及顾问责任。监管机构对公司秘书作为高级管理人员施加的是不可转授的个人责任。

 外聘公司秘书之法律风险重估

本案揭示现行业态中三项结构性法律风险：

• 责任与报酬严重脱节：服务供应商收取专业费用，惟获具名委任为公司秘书的个别从业人员，往往仅获微薄津贴。一旦发生合规缺失，联交所的制裁对象为该具名公司秘书。公开谴责可能对其专业资格（包括作为 (a) 香港公司治理公会会员、(b) 律师或大律师（《法律执业者条例》所界定）、或 (c) 注册会计师（《专业会计师条例》所界定））及个人声誉造成长远影响。
• 「非雇员」身份不构成免责理由：联交所于2021年《咨询总结》中明确指出，其并不区分「内部公司秘书」与「外聘公司秘书」。具名公司秘书对上市公司日常事务的熟悉程度不足，并非减责因素，而是接受任命前必须自行评估的执业风险。
• 个人监管制裁的实际法律后果：公开谴责并非单纯的名誉处分。根据《上市规则》第10B条，被制裁人士可能被视为不适合担任任何上市公司的高级管理人员或董事，严重影响其日后执业及董事任职资格。

 执业建议：降低个人法律风险之必要措施

若阁下现正担任或拟接受任何上市公司的「具名公司秘书」职务（尤其是以外部服务商身份），建议采取以下风险管控措施：

• 建立不可转授的个人审阅机制：明确列明必须由本人亲自查阅及批核的关键文件类别（例如：业绩公告草稿、年报、须予公布交易及关联交易的通函等）。切勿仅依赖团队电邮转发或口头汇报。
• 审阅服务协议的责任条款：仔细审阅与上市公司签订的委聘函，确保当中合约条款并无不当转移个人监管合规责任。同时，确保委聘函赋予充分的资讯获取权及文件查阅权，包括查阅董事会会议原件。
• 评估多重任职的实质可行性：若同时担任超过六家上市公司的公司秘书，应审慎评估是否确实能对每家公司的日常事务保持足够认识。否则，一旦任何公司出现违规情况，监管机构可能引用本案，认定阁下「因负荷过重而未能履行个人监察职责」。
• 董事及高级人员责任保险：阁下应确保上市公司为其董事及高级人员安排适当保险，以应对其可能面临的法律诉讼风险。相关保险保障范围应涵盖公司秘书（无论内部或外聘）所可能面对的监管程序及纪律行动的相关责任。

三、总结

本案已清晰划出红线：联交所正进一步强化公司秘书一职的个人问责。任何接受具名任命的人士，不论其服务模式为内部或外聘，均应视该职位为高级管理人员职能，履行个人监督、专业判断及及时补救的责任，以确保合规及良好企业管治。

报酬与风险是否匹配，并非监管机构的考虑因素。监管机构传递的信息清晰明确：当载有潜在违规事项的文件送达「具名」公司秘书时，阁下是否已亲自审阅并提出必要质询？

详情请参阅:

（中文版）
https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-Market/Listing/Rules-and-Guidance/Disciplinary-and-Enforcement/Disciplinary-Sanctions/2026/2605192_SoDA_tc.pdf

（英文版）
https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-Market/Listing/Rules-and-Guidance/Disciplinary-and-Enforcement/Disciplinary-Sanctions/2026/2605192_SoDA.pdf

如阁下希望就具体个案评估《上市规则》合规风险、公司秘书责任或相关风险管控安排，请联系本所合伙人刘砚枫律师、叶庭宜高级律师或梁绍江律师。

本新闻简讯仅供一般参考。其内容不构成亦不应视为法律意见，亦不构成律师与客户之间的专业关系。阁下不应在未取得针对具体事实及情况的专业法律意见前，单纯依赖本简讯内容作出决定或采取（或不采取）任何行动。史蒂文生黄律师事务所不会就任何因倚赖本处所载资料而引致或与之有关的任何特别、间接或相应而生的损失或损害承担法律责任。